- Link:
- http://hdl.handle.net/10202/295
- Collection:
-
- Subjects
- Deforestation Game theory Economic models
- Creator:
- Angelsen, Arild
- Language
- en
- Publisher
- Chr. Michelsen Institute
- Relation
- CMI Working paper
- Relation
- WP 1997: 7
- Type
- Working Paper
- Description
- This paper explores possible strategic interactions
between the state and local community in games of tropical forest
land appropriation. Two key questions are addressed. First, how
does the structure of the game influence the extent of
deforestation? Second, under which circumstances does higher forest
appropriation by the state promote local deforestation? Three
different cases are discussed, corresponding to a development over
time towards increased forest land competition and integration of
the local community into the national economy. Particular attention
is given to the assumptions made about the local economy and the
local costs of state deforestation. The local response to more
state appropriation depends critically on these assumptions, and
less on the structure of the game (Cournot or Stackelberg). The
state will fuel local deforestation if state deforestation is
associated with provision of infrastructure (roads) which reduces
the local costs of agricultural expansion, or if the local economy
is isolated (autarky) and local behaviour is determined by survival
needs rather than income maximization.
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